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Abstract
The aim of this article is to apply Józef M. Bocheński’s logic of authority to a key 
interpersonal relation of philosophical interest: the master–disciple relation. The 
present research addresses the problem of philosophical authority in terms of the 
assumptions of the logic of authority and its consequences for philosophical histo-
riographical research and verifies the claims of the logic of authority in this respect. 
The analyses show that, in the field of philosophy, the axiological authority of the 
master plays a fundamental role and is not limited solely to epistemic or deontic 
authority.
Keywords Relation of master and disciple · Logic of authority · Józef M. Bocheński
Paper
This paper presents the results of research on Józef M. Bocheński’s logic of author-
ity applied to a basic interpersonal relation described in the history of philosophy: 
the master–disciple relation. The problem of basic interpersonal relations among/
between philosophers is important for the methodology of the history of philosophy 
because it concerns the very object of historical–philosophical research (Kubalica, 
2019).1 The motive for the present analysis is the belief underlying the practice of 
historical–philosophical research and often justified in studies on the methodology 
of the history of philosophy, viz. taking a selective approach to historical–philo-
sophical material (selectivity). The result of a selective approach is a false image 
of the history of philosophy dominated by the names of outstanding philosophers. 
Such a model is indiscriminately reproduced in popular books on the history of 
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philosophy. For example, Volume 4 of Copleston’s history includes five chapters 
on Descartes, followed by sections on Pascal, Cartesianism and Malebranche, five 
chapters on Spinoza and four on Leibniz (Copleston, 1994, p. VII–IX). This vol-
ume is a prime example of a source purveying an entirely untrue view that presents 
distinguished philosophers isolated from the historical background and trends cre-
ated by them. After all, we know that this picture is not true, and that many other 
lesser-known figures influenced the main ideas of philosophers such as Descartes. 
The point is, above all, that philosophy develops in a historically defined complex 
network of biographical, bibliographical and doxographic relations. Therefore, it is 
not only essential matters such as the terms and ideas proposed by philosophers that 
play an integral role in this process. This historical development of philosophy con-
sists ultimately in asking questions and giving answers.
The point is that collective forms of philosophical activity are not uniform in 
nature and differ primarily in the degree of unity within a particular group (Kubal-
ica, 2015, p. 55). The most united are religious–philosophical communities, such as 
the Pythagoreans. A lesser degree of community characterises philosophical schools 
such as the Academy of Plato or Lyceum of Aristotle. Further, there are the Renais-
sance disciples who, centuries later, refer to the ideas of earlier philosophers such as 
the Aristotelians and Averroists in the Middle Ages. Although the degree of com-
munity of views in these philosophical groups varies, it is worth noting that all are 
based on one model, viz. the relation of authority between master and disciple. In 
the Pythagorean setting, the master was the mythical Pythagoras, with whom all 
members of the community identified to such an extent that they did not use their 
own names, but only his. Although a lesser degree of consistency characterises the 
schools of Plato or Aristotle, the relation of authority is evident here too. Likewise, 
we see authority relations, albeit with less intensity, in the continuation of old ideas 
adapted to another time and place.
What is needed is a logically coherent model of these relations, at least regard-
ing the three basic lines of research in the history of philosophy, namely (1) elab-
oration of biographical, bibliographical and doxographic data, (2) systematisation 
of philosophical terms and ideas, and (3) study of erotetic relations of questions to 
answers. Literature on the methodology of the history of philosophy focuses mainly 
on such basic aspects as the object and methods of practicing the history of philoso-
phy (Gogacz, 1964, 1966; Swieżawski, 2005). However, what is lacking is reflection 
on such salient categories as the influence of authority that historians of philosophy 
appeal to in their descriptions.
Research has expanded knowledge of philosophical authority in light of the 
logic of authority and its consequences for philosophical historiography. It has been 
shown that, in general, the logic of authority can serve as the basis for develop-
ing the concept of philosophical authority, useful in philosophical–historiographi-
cal research, although with some modifications. Moreover, it has been shown that, 
contrary to Bocheński’s belief, not only deontic authority may be delegated (thesis 
8.1); rather, it should be assumed that, at least in philosophy, delegation also applies 
to epistemic authority.
A classic example of a non-deontic delegation in philosophy is the relation of 
authority among successive thinkers, such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle: Socrates 
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was the authority for Plato, who became the authority for Aristotle. These relations 
did not obtain at the same time, of course, because these masters were considered 
authorities by their disciples not sooner than they became their students. Although 
not impossible, it is difficult to find in the history of philosophy an example of such 
a triad coinciding. The history of philosophy, however, reveals the fundamental lim-
itation of the categorical method applied by Bocheński, which is restricted to analy-
sis focused on a single moment on the timeline. We know that authority relations do 
not just appear at some point, but arise, develop and in time disappear. The problem 
of the temporal limitation of authority relations is beyond the scope of this discus-
sion and will be left for another occasion.
Bocheński’s research on authority does not belong to the field of sociology or 
psychology; it is not psychosocial, but purely philosophical. It is primarily fun-
damental research seeking to understand what other sciences simply assume 
(Bocheński, 1974, pp. 11–12). Bocheński defines this kind of philosophy as analytic 
philosophy that explores various uses of words in order better to define their mean-
ing. The logic of authority understood in this way is an applied logic dealing with 
only some of the simplest, but not trivial, aspects of authority. It describes its basic 
and most general features, starting with “extremely trivial states of affairs (…) that 
soon give way to things that are by no means trivial” (Bocheński, 1974, p. 13, transl. 
A. Brożek). Bocheński describes the so-called semiotic situation of authority, or, 
more precisely, its pragmatic situation in the sense of Charles W. Morris’ logical 
pragmatics. On this understanding, pragmatics is a part of semiotics which captures 
the relation between verbal signs and their interpreters (sender and receiver). In any 
case, the logic of authority, so understood, does not mean for Bocheński a complete 
account of the problem, which would have to include psychology, sociology and 
other sciences as well.
The main result of this research is the conclusion that, contrary to Bocheński’s 
claim, epistemic authority may also be delegated in academic–scholarly relations 
between the master and disciple. The most important achievement of Bocheński’s 
study is the distinction between two types of authority—epistemic and deontic—
based on a purely logical analysis (Brożek, 2013). In his view, each authority can be 
identified as epistemic or deontic (4.2), which he explains in the following way:
Die epistemische Autorität ist nämlich jene des Menschen, der besser, mehr 
weiß als das Subjekt. So ist z.B. die Autorität des Lehrers für einen Studiere-
nden eine epistemische. Es ist die Autorität des Sachverständigen. Dagegen ist 
die deontische Autorität nicht jene des besser Wissenden, sondern sie gehört 
dem Vorgesetzten, dem Chef, dem Kommandeur, dem Leiter usw.
[Epistemic authority accrues to the individual who knows better, knows more 
than the subject. For example, the teacher’s authority for a student is epistemic. 
It is the authority of the expert. The deontic authority, on the other hand, is not 
that of whoever knows more and better, but that of the superior, the boss, the 
commander, the leader, etc.]. (Bocheński, 1974, p. 53; all translations mine)
Epistemic authority and deontic authority, even if they refer to the same person, 
indicate two different but closely related fields. The domain of deontic authority is 
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a class of directives, while the domain of epistemic authority is constituted by cor-
responding practical sentences (Bocheński, 1974, p. 53; Kubalica, 2020, pp. 58–59). 
Both types of authority are not mutually exclusive (4.3); on the contrary, it is desir-
able for the bearer of deontic authority to be at the same time the bearer of epistemic 
authority in the relevant field (4.4). The most important thing is that the two types 
of authority are independent, i.e., having epistemic authority does not entail having 
deontic authority (4.5) and, in particular, the bearer of deontic authority does not 
have to be an epistemic authority in the relevant field (Bocheński, 1974, p. 54).
It is important to understand the concept of epistemic authority which from the 
outset excludes the possibility of formulating directives. For Bocheński, the bearer 
of such authority is “not a superior, and so he cannot and should not instruct the sub-
ject on how he should act, but he offers him statements” (Bocheński, 1974, p. 57). 
This means that the bearer of epistemic authority cannot give advice, guidelines or 
recommendations to the subject of authority if they take the form of directives that 
define the principles of action, the type of behaviour, the procedure, the plans for 
the implementation of a specific project or even instructions concerning the imple-
mentation of a specific action. It is not easy to find a situation where Bocheński 
allows for the possibility of combining epistemic and deontic authority. Bocheński’s 
position is incompatible with the ethical intellectualism of Socrates and Plato 
(Bocheński, 1974, p. 77); he opposes the idea that philosophers should have political 
power. Thus, Bocheński proposed a very narrow definition of epistemic authority, 
which in this narrow sense is incompatible with the notion of master, because it is 
the role of the master to give specific recommendations, also of a normative nature. 
The concept of master combines epistemic and deontic authority. Let us examine the 
extent to which the two concepts of authority coincide.
A master is a distinguished person who achieves the highest level of knowledge 
or skill in a particular field, who is an authority and a role model. A master can be 
both a superior, for instance, of an association or a knightly order (deontic author-
ity), as well as a professional, for instance, a certified craftsman (epistemic author-
ity). However, the notion of master is broader than authority because it can also 
refer to a winner in a competition whom we admire and respect, but we do not obey 
his commands or recognise his knowledge, as in the case of deontic and epistemic 
authority. Therefore, we distinguish between a master in a broad and narrow sense.
The concept of master is one of the two components in the conceptual relation 
between the master and disciple; it implies complementarity with the concept of dis-
ciple and vice versa. The concept of the master is understood narrowly here and 
presupposes direct contact between master and disciple and a mutual acceptance of 
this relationship. Władysław Stróżewski describes the complex master–disciple rela-
tion by pointing to its individual and unique character and emphasising its forma-
tive function (Stróżewski, 1996). At the same time, he points out certain character-
istic features of this relation, such as shaping attitudes and ways of conduct by way 
of the master’s presence to the students, contributing to an atmosphere of freedom 
of opinion and decision without the master’s imposition, as well as expressing the 
desire to help the students. Among the properties of the master–disciple relation 
mentioned by Stróżewski, the most important is the axiological transfer of the hier-
archy of values professed by the master, in particular regarding the importance of 
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scholarly work. In this context, the unquestionable epistemic authority of the master 
reveals an additional dimension: not only deontic but also axiological. The master is 
not only an epistemic and deontic authority, but above all, an axiological one. This 
means that apart from the notion of authority, references to values, such as truth, 
should be added to the bearer–subject relations described by Bocheński within the 
logic of authority.
The master in the sense of historical–philosophical relations can be identified 
with authority in the sense given by Bocheński:
T ist eine epistemische Autorität für S im Gebiet G genau dann, wenn S prin-
zipiell jeden Satz anerkennt, der ihm mit Behauptung von T mitgeteilt wird 
und zum Gebiet G gehört.
[T is an epistemic authority for S in area G if and only if S in principle rec-
ognises as true every statement that T assertively communicates to him and 
belongs to area G.]. (Bocheński, 1974, p. 57)
The authority of the master is not absolute. An example is the classic relation 
between Plato and Aristotle. The former was only a master teacher for the latter, 
until the pupil surpassed the master. At the age of 18, Aristotle was sent to Athens 
to receive his education at Plato’s Academy (Ross, 2004, pp. 1–2). At the Academy, 
Aristotle spent a total of 19 years, during which he was first a student, then Plato’s 
assistant and finally a teacher himself. Plato had a formative influence on Aristo-
tle, although the latter departed from the master’s doctrine in his mature years. On 
the one hand, this means that the master’s competence determines the extent of his 
or her authority. On the other hand, it shows that the authority relation changes as 
the student’s competence increases until the student questions the master’s authority. 
The bearer loses the authority of the master when he or she is incompetent. When 
the subject of the master’s authority believes that he or she knows more about a 
given field than the authority he or she has recognised so far, the relation of author-
ity disappears.
In this context, Stróżewski draws attention to the personal dimension of author-
ity recognition, which consists not only in recognising every statement made by the 
subject of authority as true, as Bocheński puts it, but also in recognising the bearer 
as an authority by its subject, stressing that “without social recognition, becoming 
an authority is not possible” (Stróżewski, 1992, p. 33). Therefore, “professionalism” 
alone is not enough to establish authority; what is needed is reference to certain 
moral values, as each authority implies the presence of values: truth and respon-
sibility. Bocheński also refers to the truthfulness of the bearer of authority, but for 
Stróżewski, it implies not only not lying, but also living in truth. The second value 
element mentioned by Stróżewski concerns responsibility “for the declared truth and 
for those who await it” (Stróżewski, 1992, p. 33). Although both authors adhere to 
similar philosophical foundations, this example reveals differences between them: 
Bocheński understands authority narrowly, while Stróżewski extends its sense.
Acceptance of epistemic authority without justification may be a source of moral 
abuse, although less frequently than in the case of deontic authority (5.4). People should 
always act reasonably (Bocheński, 1974, pp. 61–62). This means that the authority of 
the master must also be justified by reasoning, although the kind of reasoning used 
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to justify epistemic authority is necessarily inductive and therefore logically weak 
(Bocheński, 1974, pp. 63–64).
In this context, the issue of value sentences accepted by the authority becomes sig-
nificant. Bocheński believes that despite differences in opinions, value sentences are 
authentic statements, and not directives or orders (Bocheński, 1974, p. 67). Bocheński 
justifies this position as follows:
Nun genügt es, sie zu analysieren, um festzustellen, daß diese Wertungen alle 
Kennzeichen der Sätze besitzen. (…) Deshalb scheinen sie Weisungen zu sein. 
Sie sind jedoch an sich keine Weisungen, sondern Sätze, die eine Grundlage für 
Weisungen bilden.
[It is now sufficient to analyse them to determine that these valuations have all 
the characteristics of statements. (...) Therefore, although they seem to be instruc-
tions, in fact, they are not; rather, they are statements that form the basis for 
instructions.]
Consequently, according to Bocheński, it is logically possible for value sentences to fall 
within the domain of epistemic authority (5.12), for example used by an expert in art or 
by a moral authority. If, therefore, there are indeed epistemic authorities in the field of 
value judgments (5.13), there is nothing to prevent the master, as an epistemic author-
ity, from formulating value judgments, unless they are directives. Even in the narrow 
understanding of the concept, if an epistemic authority can judge a value, then he or she 
can be an axiological authority. These notions are not contradictory.
The fundamental difference between deontic and epistemic authority is revealed in 
the delegation of authority. Bocheński concludes that:
Die deontische Autorität, nicht aber die epistemische, kann delegiert werden.
[Deontic authority can be delegated, but epistemic authority cannot]. (Bocheński, 
1974, p. 92, 8.1)
This is important for the concept of master set forth here because, on the narrow 
understanding of the authority of the master, it turns out that its bearer can delegate 
only deontic authority. However, if one takes into consideration the axiological author-
ity of the master, the question arises of whether this kind of authority can be delegated.
For Bocheński, delegation has a much more complex structure than authority itself 
(Bocheński, 1974, p. 92) because, apart from the delegating bearer (T), the subject (S) 
and the domain (G), it also includes the delegated bearer (D) and the delegated domain 
(F) (8.2). In this way, we obtain a quintuple relation, which implies five quadruple rela-
tions, ten ternary relations and ten binary relations, as shown in Fig. 8.21.
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(Bocheński 1974, 94)
The triangles TSG and DSF correspond to the already known basic structure of 
authority, so we know six out of ten binary relations (TS, TG, SG, DS, DF and SF), 
and delegation creates the remaining four relations: TD, TF, GD and FG.
If we now refer the relation of delegating authority to the master–disciple rela-
tion—assuming that it goes beyond the relation of epistemic authority, which, 
according to Bocheński, cannot be delegated—we arrive at the following logical 
consequences that need analysing. The TD relation is fundamental for the structure 
of delegation and it requires the following actions:
1. Der Hauptträger (der Delegierende) faßt den Entschluß, jemanden als Del-
egierten zu bestellen. Es handelt sich hier um einen inneren Willensakt, der 
eine Voraussetzung der Delegation ist, allein aber noch nicht genügt, sie her-
zustellen.
2. Dazu ist noch eine Mitteilung dieses Entschlusses an dem Delegierten not-
wendig. Eine solche Mitteilung heißt »Ernennung«: denn durch sie wird der 
Delegierte gerade zum Delegierten ernannt.
[1. The principal bearer (the one who delegates) decides to appoint someone 
as a delegate. This is an internal act of will which is a prerequisite for delega-
tion, but which alone is not sufficient to establish it.
2. Communication of this decision to the delegate is necessary. This commu-
nication is called "nomination": because it is through it that the delegate is 
nominated as the delegate]. (Bocheński, 1974, p. 94)
This nomination is a performative act, which, alongside statements and direc-
tives, is the third type of autonomous ideal structures2; it involves communication of 
2 Authority functions in the sphere of communication, which is why Bocheński assumes that its domain 
does not mean things or events themselves but what is communicated about these events with authority 
(Bocheński, 1974, pp. 28,29). Consequently, the domain of authority consists of unreal objects because it 
is about communication of information; not something real, but ideal.
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a specific directive to a subject for whom the delegate will be the bearer of authority. 
It is actually a kind of metadirective, that is, a directive bearing on another directive.
It is not easy to transfer a deontic delegation to an epistemic authority. The ques-
tion is whether Socrates nominated Plato in this way. Did Plato nominate Aristotle? 
Plato was one of the many students of the historical Socrates, but the master had 
such an influence on him that Plato made him the central figure in his dialogues 
(Kraut, 2006, pp. 2–3, 7). In welcoming Plato to his circle of interlocutors, Socrates 
performed such a delegation in an epistemic sense. Plato accepted Socrates’ ques-
tions as his own and so accepted this ‘delegation’.3 A similar process took place 
between Plato and Aristotle. The mutual acceptance of the nomination, that is, 
nomination as master and nomination as disciple, is the condition for an epistemic 
authority relationship in the narrow sense. The equivalent of deontic authority direc-
tives are questions formulated by the epistemic authority. The central axis of the 
relations between Socrates and Plato, on the one hand, and Plato and Aristotle, on 
the other, are philosophical questions. Therefore, we must formulate the following 
thesis to complete the logic of authority:
A.1. The epistemic authority of the master includes not only statements but also 
questions.
This is where the fundamental difference between delegating deontic authority 
and the master becomes apparent. The master–disciple relation is described in the 
literature as a direct relation; hence, it is not possible to delegate it through an act 
of nomination. From this, it can be concluded that the authority of the master is not 
deontic but of a different kind, because he or she does not nominate delegates, but 
asks them questions. The value of questions lies primarily in the fact that a question, 
once well posed, crystallises research interests in a particular discipline of knowl-
edge. One could say that it has a formative function, that is, it creates a scientific 
discipline. Hence the notion of epistemic authority should necessarily be enriched 
by the inheritance of questions which, once formulated, inspire subsequent genera-
tions to search.
Another difference becomes visible when we consider the position of the del-
egate. According to Bocheński, a delegate does not have to accept delegation 
(Bocheński, 1974, p. 96). The situation is different in the case of the master–disci-
ple relation, where the student must consciously and directly accept the master as 
the master and an authority. This leads to the conclusion that apart from epistemic 
authority, the master must have authority of a different nature than deontic. We have 
called this kind of authority axiological authority, and its basic properties are dis-
cussed below.
Referring to the phenomenology of the authority of the master presented above, 
the following theses on the master–disciple relation can be formulated. One should 
start by referring to Bocheński’s logic of authority and develop his claim 4.2—pre-
serving its importance—in the following way:
3 The history of philosophy shows that the delegation of epistemic authority requires accepting the addi-
tional condition that its communication must be explicitly accepted (vernommen). Similar conclusions 
can be found in Adolf Reinach’s concepts of "soziale Akte" or Paul Grice’s meaningful communication.
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A.2. Any authority is axiological authority.
Axiological authority is vested in both epistemic authority and deontic author-
ity. The difference amounts to the type of values guiding a given type. Axiological 
epistemic authority refers to the value of truth, and therefore, it is vested in those 
people who know a particular field better than we do, for example, the authority of 
a scientist for his or her students. On the other hand, deontic authority does not refer 
to truth, although it is desirable that it should respect this value. Rather, it refers to 
other values, such as goodness, happiness, justice, etc., and so it is not a concern of 
the scientist. Axiological deontic authority is, therefore, not the authority of a per-
son who knows better, but of one who has the power and the right to give directives. 
Thus, axiological authority is not restricted to either of the aforementioned types of 
authority: epistemic or deontic. It comprises universal values which include, above 
all, truth, but also goodness, happiness, justice and others. However, a detailed axi-
ology of authority would still have to be elaborated, as this subject is beyond the 
scope of this article.
We are interested in the master–disciple relation understood as a collection of 
true propositions. Both the master and the student strive to know the truth, but the 
master is more advanced in this aspiration, for instance, because of age, education, 
experience, etc. It can therefore be concluded that:
A.3. The authority of the master is epistemic authority for the student.
Therefore, all Bocheński’s statements concerning epistemic authority and the 
ways of justifying it, as well as those concerning rationalism as a rejection of epis-
temic authority (theses 5.1–6.8),4 should be regarded as applicable.
In Bocheński’s terms, the master’s authority is based on a three-part relation 
between the bearer, the subject and the domain of authority. The bearer is the mas-
ter with authority; the subject of the master’s authority is another person, i.e. the 
student. Because in real life the relations of authority, including the master’s author-
ity, are interchangeable, i.e. the bearer of authority may become its subject and vice 
versa, the third term, the domain of the master’s authority, is important. It is usu-
ally narrow—for example, a thesis supervisor for a doctoral student in a specific 
field, discipline and scientific specialty, or a master bricklayer for a student assistant 
bricklayer. In the case of the master’s authority, Bocheński’s claim that every human 
authority is limited to a certain domain is confirmed (Bocheński, 1974, p. 23). Res-
ervations that remain refer to the fact that the master’s authority in the narrow sense 
of the term is time-bound, as shown in the examples above, that is, the relation of 
authority builds in time and most often does not last forever.
As the bearer of authority, the master becomes an authority in a given field for 
the subject of authority when the subject (a student) in principle recognises what-
ever the bearer says as true, provided that it belongs to this domain. This does not 
exclude the possibility of a mistake on the part of the master, which may befall even 
4 Bocheński believes that rationalism is based only on reason which, just as according to Descartes, 
achieves the ideae clarae et distinctae by its means. Therefore, Bocheński considers that rationalism con-
sists in not respecting any other authority. His extreme position towards rationalism stems from his Anti-
Enlightenment stance (Kubalica 2020, p. 57).
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the best authority. Infallibility is not an important feature of the master, but the ina-
bility to admit error excludes the possibility of becoming an authority. The indis-
pensable feature of the master is, firstly, being recognised as an authoritative master; 
therefore, with regard to the master, the general definition of authority proposed by 
Bocheński remains valid:
Satz 1.3: T ist eine Autorität für S im Gebiet G genau dann, wenn S prin-
zipiell alles, was ihm von T mit Behauptung mitgeteilt wird und zum Gebiet G 
gehört, anerkennt.
[T is an authority for S in the domain G if and only if S in principle accepts eve-
rything that T assertively communicates to him and belongs to the domain G.].  
(Bocheński, 1974, p. 25)
The pragmatic situation described by Bocheński assumes that the necessary condi-
tion for the master’s authority is potential – although not necessarily actual – com-
munication, which means that the master remains an authority even if we are not 
interested in what he or she announces. A master is a master even when no disciple 
currently recognises him. For a master to exist, it is sufficient that the subject of 
authority can take note of what the bearer of authority says, accepting the content 
of the message as true. The seven factors mentioned by Bocheński, which logically 
assume the communication of authority, also correspond to the communication of 
the authority of the master. I also assume that the questions that the master poses to 
him or herself and the student can undeniably be included in the area of communica-
tion from the master.
When analysing the domain of authority, Bocheński considers its two meanings 
(often interrelated): (1) a class, a plurality of real events (activities, actions) and (2) 
a set of such events in the form of a set of directives (propositions) about them. Due 
to the fact that authority functions in the area of communication, Bocheński opts for 
the latter meaning (Bocheński, 1974, p. 28). Consequently, the domain of author-
ity consists of unreal objects, since it is about communicating information, includ-
ing questions, which are not real but ideal objects. It is important, however, that 
information or questions do not consist merely of the words which form sentences 
in a message, because it does not convey just words or their meanings. The same 
message can be conveyed using words in other languages. Therefore, the domain of 
authority is not limited to words alone. Information is something immaterial, spir-
itual and mental; it is a thought in the sense that the bearer of authority must always 
think something when uttering a sentence. Yet what the authority communicates 
(within the domain of authority) is not the thought itself, but its content (Bocheński, 
1974, p. 29). Therefore, the domain of the master’s authority is not real either; it is 
ideal (2.1). Just as in the case of authority understood broadly, the domain of the 
master’s authority is not a single piece of information or a single item of content 
(e.g. a sentence taken out of context), but a class, i.e. a collection of ideal objects 
(2.2). This set includes not only affirmative sentences but also questions for which 
specific knowledge is the basis.
In the master–disciple relation, there are also requirements concerning the subject 
of authority, such as being a conscious individual (2.3). In order to understand a 
sign and its meaning, one has to be aware of it (Bocheński, 1974, p. 30). This means 
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that artificial intelligence, such as a computer, cannot be the subject of authority 
because, although it is capable of receiving messages, this ability depends on a spe-
cific programme designed by conscious individuals. Moreover, in normal circum-
stances, the master’s authority is an individual matter (2.4), even though it applies 
also to psychosocial phenomena. Bocheński gives an example of the herd instinct 
and blind imitation occurring when an order is carried out uncritically, as in the 
Stanford Prison Experiment. This is a unique situation of ‘emotional infectiousness’, 
with a mass of people thinking like a single individual.
Nowhere else is thesis 2.6 more applicable than in the case of the master: the 
bearer of authority is a human being and not a group of people. There are no col-
legial masters. Of course, one can talk about the authority of a group, e.g. the doc-
tors’ council, but this can easily be reduced to the authority of individual members 
(Bocheński, 1974, p. 32). This applies even to a group organised into a committee 
or a think tank. The condition for the subject of authority is consciousness, which 
is always individual; it belongs to a single person and not to a group. Admittedly, 
looking from another perspective at the history of philosophy, we find collective for-
mations practising philosophical activity, for example, Plato’s Academy, Aristotle’s 
Lyceum, the Southwest or Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism and others. While in 
these kinds of formations, a vital role is played by the master, who is a person, the 
collective plays a not insignificant role too, which in some sense amplifies the influ-
ence of the master. However, the question of how this happens goes beyond the logic 
of authority.
In principle, we must agree that authority in philosophy is always individual, but 
the degree of commonality of views in philosophical groups is different. An excep-
tion is the authority that Pythagoras enjoyed in the Pythagorean sect (Krokiewicz, 
2000, p. 93). In the Pythagorean community, one can see the highest degree of con-
sensus expressed in the use of the name of the founder of the community (Pythago-
rean) for all views of its members. The history of the Pythagorean sect, however, is 
an extreme example and should be treated as a boundary point marking the whole 
spectrum of possibilities for shaping relations of authority. A lesser degree of con-
sistency can be found in Plato’s or Aristotle’s schools, where the founders personally 
supervised investigations.
At this point, one may ask what follows from the general properties of authority 
as a binary relation—contained in the tertiary relation of authority—between the 
bearer and the subject. According to thesis 3.1, no one is an authority for oneself 
in any field; similarly, no master is a master for him or herself. The relation of the 
authority of the master is thus irreflexive.
Moreover, in the relation of the master’s authority, it is also logically possible 
that T is the bearer and S the subject of authority in one field, and at the same time, 
T is the subject and S the bearer of authority in another (3.2). This means that the 
master’s bearer–subject relation is not asymmetric (Bocheński, 1974, p. 39). A mas-
ter in one domain can be a disciple in another domain of knowledge, with his or her 
student appearing on this latter occasion as a master.
In the group of philosophers discussed above, it is not easy to show an example 
of a non-asymmetric relation. Nevertheless, one should agree with Bocheński, who 
clarifies the essence of the master’s authority in thesis 3.3 in the following way:
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Ist T eine Autorität für S im Gebiet G, dann ist S keine Autorität für T in G.
[If T is the authority for S in domain G, then S is not the authority for T in 
domain G.]. (Bocheński, 1974, p. 40)
This means that authority (or, to be precise, the bearer–subject relation) is an 
asymmetrical relation within one field. The above statement reflects the current 
state of the relation and does not rule out the possibility that these roles may 
change, and that after some time, the relation may be reversed, with the student 
superseding the master. Rarely, however, does the master recognise that he or she 
has been superseded. The relation between Heinrich Rickert and Emil Lask can 
be cited as such an example. After Lask’s death, Rickert explicitly admitted that, 
on many points, his disciple had been right and had outdone him (Rickert, 2018, 
pp. 11–18). The example given confirms Bocheński’s thesis. Rickert recognised 
Lask’s epistemic authority only after his death, so it is difficult to speak of an 
authority relation in the narrow sense (that is, between living persons). Hence, it 
is not true that the relationship of epistemic authority in domain G is not asym-
metric if it is considered at a given point in time.
Another characteristic of the relation of authority is its transitive nature. At 
this point, the question should be asked: is the authority of the master a transi-
tive relation? In Bocheński’s view, it is not transitive if two different domains are 
involved:
Ist A eine Autorität für B im Gebiet G und B für C im selben, dann ist auch A 
eine Autorität für C in G
[If A is an authority for B in domain G, and B is the same for C, then A is also 
an authority for C in domain G]. (Bocheński, 1974, p. 42; 3.4)
It can therefore be concluded that an authority for an authority is also an author-
ity for the subject provided that the field does not change: the bearer–subject rela-
tion of authority is transitive when it comes to the same domain (Bocheński, 1974, 
p- 41). The same applies to a master’s authority: the master for the master is the 
master for the student in the same domain. Transitivity of the authority relation can 
be observed in the relation between Fries and Nelson when we include a third figure, 
Kant, who is an authority in the domain of philosophy for both philosophers. It can 
therefore be said that, if Kant is an authority for Fries in the field of philosophy, and 
Fries is the same for Nelson, then Kant is also an authority for Nelson in the field of 
philosophy. In this case, we cannot speak of authority relations in the narrow sense, 
since the three philosophers never met in real life. However, if we adopt a broader 
understanding of authority as a timeless influence, it should be considered to con-
firm Bocheński’s thesis. Hence, it is not true that the epistemic authority relation in 
domain G is not transitive.
To recapitulate, the relation of the authority of the master is also a bearer–subject 
relationship and is (1) irreflexive, (2) asymmetric and (3) transitive, with the latter 
two being limited to the same domain (Bocheński, 1974, p. 42). Bocheński believes 
that these properties of authority are a necessary condition for the possibility of 
hierarchy and delegation of authority. These qualities are the formal characteristics 
of the authority of the master.
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Is there any authority of the master extending to all domains? Bocheński 
believes that there is no, and there cannot be, absolute human authority 
(Bocheński, 1974, p. 44). Recognition of absolute human authority is based on 
harmful mythologies, such as fascist or communist totalitarianism. The point is 
that everyone has authority in at least one domain, even a child who certainly 
knows better than anyone else whether his stomach hurts. The example Bocheński 
gives of a child’s authority makes it possible not only to reject totalitarianism, 
but also to refute a radically anti-authoritarian rationalistic and anarchist mythol-
ogy, whose representatives claim that there is no authority at all. Bocheński takes 
an intermediate position between accepting the existence of human absolute 
authority (totalitarianism) and the total rejection of all authority (rationalism). 
Bocheński’s conclusions find confirmation in the history of philosophy. The his-
tory of philosophy presents examples of classical philosophical authorities, but 
there is no absolute authority among them. In the example of Plato–Aristotle, we 
see very clearly the boundary of the master’s authority, which corresponds to the 
Latin phrase: amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas, which is a paraphrase of 
both Aristotle’s and Plato’s views (Guerlac, 1978, p. 627). Plato was not an abso-
lute but partial authority for Aristotle. The limited nature of authority means that 
he was an authority to him only insofar as his teachings were consistent with the 
values they both professed, above all, with truth.
Also in the case of the master–disciple relation, the master has no absolute 
authority; his or her authority is limited to a specific domain. Absolute author-
ity attributed to a human being or a group of people amounts to idolatry of a 
very bad kind (Bocheński, 1974, p. 45). Violating this principle is an abuse of 
authority. Bocheński clearly states that there are two different types of authority 
abuse: (a) abuse of authority in a certain domain, e.g. a scientist making political 
statements and (b) abuse of the subject, e.g. an officer issuing orders to civilians 
(Bocheński, 1974, p. 45) The problem is that, in connection with thesis 1.3, it is 
difficult to distinguish between abuse of authority and true authority. Therefore, 
Bocheński introduces a new concept of justified authority stipulating that:
Was aber eine Begründung der Autorität ist, läßt sich im allgemeinen nicht 
sagen: die Begründung ist nämlich nach der Art der Autorität sehr ver-
schieden.
[What justifies authority cannot be said in general, because the justification 
depends on the type of authority]. (Bocheński, 1974, p. 46)
The justification of the authority of the master sets the limit beyond which abuse of 
authority takes place. Bocheński states that:
Der Träger einer Autorität mißbraucht sie, wenn er sie in Hinblick auf ein 
Subjekt oder auf ein Gebiet auszuüben versucht, für bzw. in welchem seine 
Autorität unbegründet ist.
[The bearer of authority abuses it if he attempts to exercise it in respect to a 




According to Bocheński, abuse results from an unjustified generalisation of author-
ity based on the classic sophism ab uno disce omnes (generalisation). In logical 
terms, victims of this error silently assume that the bearer is more intelligent, more 
powerful, etc. than the subject, and that he or she must also have an advantage over 
them in other domains (Bocheński, 1974, p. 47). From a psychological point of 
view, in turn, the recognition of a false authority results from the habit of looking up 
to a person as the bearer of authority, which in some cases turns into an automatic 
reaction, with the subject responding uncritically and without reflection (Bocheński, 
1974, pp. 47–48). The most frequent abuse of authority concerns the epistemic type 
of authority; hence, it also applies to the authority of the master.
Referring to Bocheński’s distinctions, it can be assumed that, for the student, the 
personality-forming function determined by the master–disciple relation consists in 
the student gaining maturity and the status of a subject thanks to the influence of the 
master’s authority. In other words, the master–disciple relation is formative in that 
it contributes to the formation of a subject: Thanks to the influence of the master’s 
authority, the student gains his or her own personality. Unlike an individual or an 
instance of a class, the term ‘person’ does not reduce a human being to a purely 
physical or biological existence but treats him or her as the subject and the object 
of human relations. One of the basic characteristics of the person is self-awareness, 
which, as a key to self-control, is the principal tool for personal development. The 
influence of the master’s authority does not limit but supports the self-awareness of 
the person, so that he or she can strive for his or her own perfection.
Another issue is related to the definition of the field of epistemic authority, which 
is a class of propositions. The point is that the master–disciple relation implies not 
only a transfer of knowledge itself, but also a transfer of a certain problem area, 
which is expressed in questions. Following the master, the student considers some 
of them important and undertakes work to find the answers. Bocheński’s approach 
does not implement erotetic logic, which does not mean that such an application is 
not possible.
This article has attempted to apply the logic of authority to the history of phi-
losophy concerning master–student relations. Bocheński’s view is confronted with 
Stróżewski’s phenomenology of authority. The approach taken here may be criti-
cised for not growing out of the analytical perspective of Bocheński’s methodology 
but out of the phenomenological perspective. This criticism would be justified if the 
article aimed to analyse the concept of authority itself. In contrast, the aim of this 
article has been to confront this notion with the history of philosophy. It is only 
against this background that Bocheński’s approach turns out to be correct, and only 
within the limits set by the analytical method. In Bocheński’s considerations, it is 
difficult to find a claim that his analysis is exhaustive.
In fact, Bocheński presents only necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for 
the possibility of authority, and he expressis verbis sets himself apart from psy-
chological and sociological approaches. I am convinced that Stróżewski’s phe-
nomenological and axiological perspective can serve as a good point of reference, 
since he, too, studies the essence independent of detailed sciences. Stróżewski 
points to axiological features of the authority relation, such as the transfer of 
the hierarchy of values professed by the master and the reference to the value of 
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truth. He reveals the axiological dimension of the master’s authority and, at the 
same time, shows the dynamics of the master–student relation, which is missing 
in Bocheński’s analytical approach.
Before closing, I would like to include a short summary here. In my opinion, 
the pure logic of epistemic authority is not enough to describe the master–disciple 
relation in the field of philosophy. The primary limitation is that this logic does 
not reflect the dynamics of the authority relationship. It is hard to understand this 
dynamic without taking into account the questions that have been asked and the 
answers that have been offered by the master. Another component is necessary to 
complete the picture, which I call axiological authority. The master–student rela-
tion is also a community of specific values. Only the adoption of similar values 
allows for the assumption that the master is an epistemic authority for the student.
In conclusion, I would like to add that this article certainly does exhaust the 
issue of the relationship of authority in the history of philosophy. It is not easy 
to cover all the diversity in this field, and that is why I concentrated on the most 
classical accounts known from many handbooks on the history of philosophy. 
However, this means that there is a need for further research to better understand 
the influence of authorities on the development of philosophical thought and to 
avoid a selective approach focused only on some of the personalities in the his-
tory of philosophy.
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